Saturday, 12 September 2026
Online scams may reach their victims through a telephone, social-media account or fraudulent investment platform, but behind many of the world’s largest operations sits something much more physical: offices, hotels, casinos, apartment buildings and secured compounds. New research suggests these properties have become part of an international criminal infrastructure sustained not only by technology, but also by corruption, political protection and human trafficking.
A Transparency International study published in August 2026 describes large scam operations as a governance and human rights problem extending well beyond conventional cybercrime. The research concludes that substantial operations frequently depend on some form of official assistance, allowing criminal organisations to move workers, operate with limited interference and, in some cases, receive advance warning of enforcement action.
The financial scale is difficult to measure precisely, but the numbers are enormous. Research cited by Transparency International estimates that worldwide scam losses exceeded US$1 trillion in 2024, approaching 1% of global economic output. The figure should be regarded as an estimate rather than a precise measurement, but independent evidence confirms that the financial impact runs into many billions of dollars.
Technology has helped criminal organisations expand their reach. Artificial intelligence can provide rapid translation, cloned voices, fabricated images and convincing documents, making it easier to approach victims across different languages and jurisdictions. Cryptocurrency can provide another mechanism for moving stolen funds and making transactions more difficult for investigators to follow.
Yet the physical infrastructure behind the industry is equally important. Transparency International found that scam operations range from small units inside apartments and houses to extensive businesses occupying offices and secured compounds. Large centres can resemble conventional companies, with separate technology, finance, human resources and security functions. Criminal activity can even operate alongside legitimate companies within the same commercial property.
This creates a direct connection with real estate. Hotels, casinos, villas, apartment complexes and offices have all been used for scam operations. Border regions, areas affected by conflict and special economic zones can be particularly attractive because weaker oversight makes criminal businesses easier to establish and, when necessary, relocate.
Cambodia provides some of the clearest evidence of how property can become embedded in this economy. US authorities have identified scam operations conducted from casinos, resorts and office parks, including properties converted to accommodate large numbers of workers conducting online fraud. Some of those workers were themselves victims of trafficking who had been forced to participate in scams.
The property relationship can extend beyond criminals secretly occupying buildings. US investigations have identified cases where politically connected owners allegedly generated rental income from properties occupied by scam operators while providing associated services such as security. This creates a much more complicated question for the property industry about ownership, leasing structures and the ultimate users of commercial buildings.
Georgia demonstrates how the same industry can operate within a conventional urban environment. Transparency International’s research describes allegations involving sophisticated call centres and politically connected protection networks. A whistleblower who worked as an IT specialist within one network provided information alleging connections between scam businesses and senior officials. One Tbilisi operation identified by investigators generated US$35.3 million between 2022 and 2025 while operating close to the headquarters of the country’s State Security Service.
Subsequent investigations have resulted in criminal proceedings and convictions connected with fraudulent call centres and the protection networks surrounding them. The Georgian cases demonstrate how online fraud can become connected with conventional property ownership, money laundering and accumulated real estate assets.
The people sitting behind the computers inside these buildings are not necessarily willing participants. Transparency International found that many workers are migrants recruited through apparently genuine advertisements for programmers, marketing employees, customer-service staff and other professional positions. Recruitment can involve interviews and competency tests designed to make the employment opportunity appear legitimate.
After arriving, some workers have had passports confiscated and been subjected to debt bondage, surveillance, violence and restrictions on movement. Reports examined by Transparency International include extremely long working hours, inadequate accommodation and serious physical and sexual abuse. People escaping the compounds can face further difficulties, including detention and demands for payments from officials.
Corruption helps connect the different parts of the business. Payments can secure protection, prevent investigations or provide advance notice of raids. Transparency International cites reports from Ukraine that some scam centres paid police between US$10,000 and US$15,000 a month for protection. Other cases involve more extensive relationships between organised crime, business interests and politically connected figures.
Myanmar illustrates the extreme end of the model. Scam compounds have developed in areas where territorial control is contested and armed organisations exercise substantial authority. Transparency International documents allegations involving the Karen Border Guard Force, including the provision of security, electricity and fuel to operations and assistance with movement across the Thai border. Some compounds are believed to have accommodated thousands of trafficked workers.
For commercial real estate, the findings raise an uncomfortable due-diligence question. Knowing the company named on a lease may not always be sufficient in higher-risk locations. Owners, investors, hotel and casino operators and property managers may increasingly need to understand who ultimately controls an occupier, what activity is actually taking place inside a building and whether unusual security, employment or payment arrangements indicate risks extending beyond an ordinary tenancy.
The problem is complicated by the mobility of the industry. Scam operations do not necessarily require expensive manufacturing equipment or complicated supply chains. Telecommunications, digital tools, workers and suitable premises can be enough. When authorities increase pressure in one jurisdiction, operators can move people and equipment elsewhere and establish another centre comparatively quickly.
Closing individual facilities therefore addresses only part of the problem. Transparency International argues that governments also need stronger anti-corruption controls, closer supervision of vulnerable border areas and special economic zones, improved international cooperation and enforcement against officials who provide criminal organisations with protection.
The expanding scam economy consequently presents a new form of property risk. The digital crime encountered by a victim thousands of kilometres away may ultimately depend upon a very conventional asset: a building with electricity, telecommunications, security and enough space for a workforce. Following that physical infrastructure – who owns it, who leases it, who manages it and who receives the income – could become as important to disrupting industrial-scale online fraud as tracing the technology and money behind the scam itself.
