Monday, 20 October 2025
Two recent High Court judgments—Clarke v Guardian [2025] EWHC 2193 (KB) and Sledziewski & Anor v Persons Unknown & Anor [2024] EWHC 1955 (KB)—underscore how defamation or harassment claims without strong evidence can lead not only to dismissal but to increased reputational exposure for claimants.
In Clarke v Guardian, Noel Clarke’s defamation claim against The Guardian was dismissed on 22 August 2025. The Court found in favour of the defendant on both the truth defence (Section 2 of the Defamation Act 2013) and the public interest defence (Section 4). The first article, published 29 April 2021, alleging sexual harassment, bullying, and other misconduct by Clarke, was held to be substantially true on the basis of evidence provided by 26 oral witnesses and additional written testimonies. Because the claimant’s case required calling into question the credibility and veracity of nearly all 29 of the defendant’s witnesses, a theory of conspiracy or mass falsehood that the Court found “inherently implausible,” the truth defence succeeded. The judgment also emphasised that many of Clarke’s witnesses could not attest to specific conduct, scheduling of testimony or timely submission of hearsay evidence was problematic, and several absent witnesses reduced the strength of his case. The Court further concluded that The Guardian’s belief that publication was in the public interest was reasonable, given thorough journalistic verification, offering Clarke opportunity to respond, and careful editorial presentation. (§ Truth defence findings, serious harm requirement, public interest defence).
In Sledziewski & Anor v Persons Unknown, the claimants included a company manufacturing plaster coving products and its director. They alleged that individuals running YouTube channels had posted videos and commentary, and sent emails, amounting to harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The defendants responded that their conduct, though harsh in tone, remained within the scope of free expression and did not reach the legal threshold of “unacceptable and oppressive” behaviour required for harassment. The Court agreed, holding that while some remarks were baseless and provocative, they did not amount to the sort of conduct that the law treats as harassment. The judgment noted that publication involving criticism or citizen journalism faces particularly high scrutiny under freedom of expression (Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights).
Both cases illustrate legal principles repeatedly affirmed in recent UK case law: that in defamation actions, meeting the serious harm requirement under Section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 is essential for each publication complained of; that truth and public interest defences can succeed if the defendant demonstrates robust evidence and process; and that in harassment cases, freedom of expression is a strong counterbalance. Weak claims—those lacking direct evidence, having procedural failings, or relying heavily on character rather than specific conduct—are at risk not only of being dismissed but of further reputational damage as judicial findings may affirm the underlying allegations. They also show that litigation intended to protect reputation may succeed less often than is assumed, and that claimants must carefully assess strength of evidence, the risk of cross-examination, and public interest before initiating defamation or harassment proceedings.
Source: CMS
